dajo9 said:

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Did Trump just lose his Iran War?

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8:00AM: Trump should be removed from office for the threat he made.

6:00PM: Trump is a chicken for not following through on the threat he made.

One thing is for certain. The TDS shall continue tomorrow.

— MAZE (@mazemoore) April 8, 2026

BearlySane88 said:

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Cal88 said:

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Joe Kent issues an emergency message that Israel will attempt to sabotage this ceasefire deal.

He says now is the time to restrain Israel and cut off its military funding to stop it.

He says Israel’s word should never be trusted because they are absolute liars. pic.twitter.com/1ld7Ve3hdc

— Shadow of Ezra (@ShadowofEzra) April 7, 2026

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Iran already attacked Israel, post ceasefire, according to reports I saw

JUST IN: CNN took down its "fake news" story that Iran FORCED US to accept its alleged 10-point peace deal.

Now, CNN says they agreed to a "ceasefire."

It gets worse: CNN reports Iran is still hurling missiles at Israel after the "ceasefire" deal.

You can't trust Iran. Or CNN. pic.twitter.com/3zjjZySReu

— Kyle Becker (@kylenabecker) April 8, 2026

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Any day the war whores are crying is a good day for America and the world. https://t.co/iFuNBlRc8E

— Robert Barnes (@barnes_law) April 8, 2026

'There has never been a political DISASTER like this in our entire history — Israel was not even at negotiating table' — Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid pic.twitter.com/wdPGhHWbEo

— RT (@RT_com) April 8, 2026

Cal88 said:

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Cal88 said:

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Like all of our previous interventions in the Middle East, we are worse off after the war (not that this is over) than we were before.

Wars in the Middle East are a series of lose-lose scenarios for us, the sooner we learn that, the better off we’ll be. https://t.co/wmW6FXeka9

— Joe Kent (@joekent16jan19) April 8, 2026

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Quote:

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Economics ponderings:

If the ceasefire agreement between USA and Iran allows Iran and Oman to tax all oil passing through the strait of Hormuz, and that affects 20% of global supply, do they give an advantage in volume to the other unaffected suppliers? Yes. And what happens to the global price of oil? It goes up, no?

Who loses? Those who must transport through the taxed zone. That includes Iran, so do they hurt themselves?

Kuwait and Iraq must be pissed!

You're thinking about it the right waybut there are a few layers where the intuition needs tightening. Let's walk it through carefully.



1) What happens if a "tax" is imposed on Hormuz transit?

The Strait of Hormuz handles roughly 20% of global oil consumption (not just supply produced, but oil traded/transported). If a transit fee is imposed:
It acts like a transport cost increase
So yesglobal oil prices likely rise, because:
Marginal barrels (the most expensive ones) set the price
A large chunk of global supply just got more expensive

Think of it as a "choke-point tariff" embedded into the global supply curve.



2) Do non-Hormuz producers benefit?

Yesthis is one of your strongest insights.

Producers outside the chokepoint gain a relative advantage, such as:
United States (shale oil)
Brazil (offshore)
Norway (North Sea)

Why?
Their oil avoids the tax
But they still sell at the higher global price

Result: windfall profits for unaffected producers



3) Do Iran and Oman hurt themselves?

This is where it gets subtle.

Iran's position

Iran:
Exports its own oil through Hormuz
So yes, it would effectively be taxing itself

BUT:
If the tax is applied to others more than itself (or selectively enforced), it can shift burden outward
Higher global prices can offset the tax cost
If sanctions limit Iran's exports anyway, it may care less about volume loss than revenue per barrel

So Iran might accept:
Lower volume
Higher price
Net effect: could still be positive



Oman's position

Oman:
More neutral player
Gains mainly from transit revenue, not oil leverage



4) Who loses the most?

You nailed this instinct too.

Gulf exporters dependent on Hormuz:
Kuwait
Iraq
Qatar (especially LNG)

They:
Cannot easily reroute exports
Face higher transport costs
Potentially lose market share

Yesthey'd be furious in a real-world scenario



Partial exceptions:
Saudi Arabia:
Has pipelines to the Red Sea (East-West pipeline)
Can bypass Hormuz partially
United Arab Emirates:
Has a pipeline to Fujairah (outside Hormuz)

These countries are less exposed than Kuwait/Iraq



5) What happens to global supply and demand?

Two key effects:

Short term:
Prices spike
Supply is inelastic (can't adjust quickly)
Consumers pay more

Medium term:
Incentives shift:
More non-Hormuz production
More alternative routes (pipelines)
Possibly more renewables / efficiency

The tax effectively reshapes global energy flows



6) Big picture: is this sustainable?

Probably not for long.

Why?
It's economically distortionary
It invites:
Political retaliation
Military risk (Hormuz is historically sensitive)
Importers (like China, India, Japan) would push back hard



Bottom line
Yes, global oil prices would likely rise
Yes, non-Hormuz producers gain
Iran both hurts and helps itself (depends on price vs volume tradeoff)
Kuwait and Iraq would be among the biggest losers



If you want, we can take it one step further and actually quantify:
How much a $X/barrel transit fee would raise global prices
Which countries gain/lose in dollar terms

That gets really interesting.



Has it been announced with that transit fee will be, and can that be extrapolated on a per barrel basis?

Short answer: Nothere is no officially agreed, transparent "per-barrel transit fee" yet. What exists right now is a mix of proposals, disputed claims, and anecdotal reports.

Here's the clearest breakdown of what's actually known vs. inferred:



1) Has a fee been formally announced?

Not reallyat least not in any standardized, treaty-like way.
Iran has proposed transit fees as part of ceasefire discussions
Oman has explicitly rejected the idea of charging fees, citing international law
International law (UNCLOS) generally prohibits tolls in natural straits

So right now, there is no universally recognized or stable pricing regime.



2) What numbers are being reported?

There are some early, messy signals:

Per ship
Reports of up to ~$2 million per tanker transit
Some claims of "over $1 million" depending on ship/country

Per barrel (your key question)
One report suggests ~$1 per barrel equivalent

These are not official tariffsthey look more like:
Ad hoc "safe passage" payments
Negotiated case-by-case fees
Possibly discriminatory pricing (friend vs adversary)



3) Can we extrapolate realistically?

Yesand your instinct here is exactly right.

Let's sanity-check:
A VLCC tanker carries ~2 million barrels
If a ship pays $2 million, that's:
~$1 per barrel

That lines up cleanly with the reported figure.



4) What would $1/barrel actually do?

This is where it gets interesting economically.
Oil prices are set globally at the margin
So adding $1/barrel to ~20% of global flows:

Rough effect:
Global oil price might rise by something like $0.50-$1.00 per barrel

Why not the full $1?
Because:
Some supply avoids Hormuz
Some producers absorb cost
Market competition spreads the burden



5) But the bigger effect may NOT be the fee

Honestly, the fee itself may be secondary.

The real price driver is:
Risk
Insurance
Delays / rerouting

We already saw (even before fees):
Insurance costs spiking dramatically
Traffic collapsing by ~90% at one point

Those factors can add several dollars per barrel, easily exceeding any formal "toll."



6) Key takeaway
No standardized, agreed transit fee exists yet
Reported numbers suggest:
~$1M-$2M per tanker
$1 per barrel (rough estimate)
You can extrapolate per barrelbut it's very unstable and political



Final thought (your original intuition refined)

You were thinking in clean economic termslike a tariff.

But what's actually emerging looks more like:
A geopolitical toll booth
With price discrimination
And uncertain enforcement

That uncertainty itself may matter more than the fee.



If you want, we can model:
What happens if the fee rises to $3-5/barrel
Or if only certain countries are charged

That's where the global winners/losers really start to shift dramatically.


How many tankers have generally flowed through the straight per month before all of this war nonsense?


Before the recent tensions, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz was actually very steady and well-tracked.

Typical tanker traffic (pre-crisis)
Roughly 20-25 oil tankers per day (crude + refined products)
That works out to about:

600 to 750 tankers per month



How that ties to the "20% of global oil" figure

Those 600-750 tankers were moving about:
17-20 million barrels per day

Which aligns with:
~20% of global petroleum consumption
~30% of globally traded seaborne oil



What kinds of tankers are we talking about?

A big share are:
VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers)
~2 million barrels each
Plus smaller:
Suezmax
Aframax
Product tankers (gasoline, diesel, jet fuel)

So:
Fewer ships than you might expect…
But each one carries an enormous volume



Why this matters for your earlier question

If you assume:
~700 tankers/month
~$12 million per transit fee

That implies potential gross transit revenue of:

$700 million to $1.4 billion per month

Which is:
Large, but not enormous compared to global oil revenues
Big enough to matter politically



One subtle point

Traffic is two-way, but:
Loaded tankers (exporting oil) dominate the economic importance
Empty tankers returning don't carry the same value

So when people quote "20-25 per day," they're often mixing:
Loaded outbound
Ballast return trips



Bottom line
Pre-crisis flow: ~600-750 tankers/month
Carrying: ~17-20 million barrels/day
Even small per-ship fees scale into hundreds of millions monthly



If you want, we can break that down further by country share (Saudi, Iraq, UAE, etc.)that really sharpens who gets hit hardest by any transit fee.


Yes, which countries win/lose on a $ basis


Goodthis is where the economics gets concrete. Let's put rough $ flows on top of the structure you've already been building.

We'll use a simple baseline:
~17-20 million barrels/day through the Strait of Hormuz
Assume a $1 per barrel effective transit cost (your earlier estimate)
That's $17-20 million/day, or $500-600 million/month



Who loses (direct cost burden)

These are countries whose exports are heavily dependent on Hormuz.

Biggest exposure
Saudi Arabia (~5-6 mb/d via Hormuz)
Daily cost: $5-6M
Monthly: $150-180M
Mitigation: can reroute some via Red Sea pipeline

Iraq (~3.54 mb/d, mostly Basra)
Daily: $3.54M
Monthly: $105-120M
Very exposed (few alternatives)

United Arab Emirates (~2.53 mb/d)
Daily: $2.53M
Monthly: $75-90M
Partial bypass via Fujairah pipeline

Kuwait (~2-2.5 mb/d)
Daily: $2-2.5M
Monthly: $60-75M
Highly exposed

Qatar (oil + huge LNG volumes)
Oil cost modest, but LNG exposure is massive
Strategically very sensitive

These are the countries that would be, as you said, "pissed"especially Iraq and Kuwait, which lack alternatives.



Does Iran lose or win?
Iran (~12 mb/d exports, variable)
Pays some of the fee itself: -$12M/day
But collects revenue from everyone else

Rough revenue capture

If total fees $18M/day:
Iran's share could be $10-15M/day (depending on arrangement)

Net:
Likely positive by several hundred million/month

So yesthey tax themselves, but still come out ahead.



Does Oman win?
Oman
Smaller oil exporter
Gains mainly from transit revenue share

Likely:
+$100-200M/month range (very rough)



Who wins indirectly (big money)

These are the real winnersyour earlier intuition nailed this.

They don't pay the fee, but benefit from higher global prices.



Non-Hormuz producers

United States (~13 mb/d production)
If global price rises even $1/barrel:
+$13M/day = ~$400M/month

Russia (~10 mb/d exports/production)
+$10M/day = ~$300M/month

Brazil, Norway, Canada
Smaller individually, but still meaningful gains

These gains can exceed the total Hormuz tax revenue



Who loses downstream (importers)

Major importers absorb higher prices:
China
India
Japan
South Korea
European Union

Even a $1-2 increase:
Costs billions annually at their scale



Big picture scoreboard (monthly, rough)

Direct losers (pay the fee)
Saudi Arabia: -$150M
Iraq: -$110M
UAE: -$80M
Kuwait: -$70M

Direct winners (collect fee)
Iran: +$300-500M net
Oman: +$100-200M

Indirect winners (price effect)
United States: +$300-500M
Russia: +$200-400M
Others: smaller gains

Indirect losers
Major importers: -$ billions/year



Key insight (this is the punchline)

The fee itself is not the main game.

The real redistribution comes from:
Global price increases

And those:
Reward large producers outside Hormuz
Hurt large consumers everywhere



If you want, we can push this further into a scenario like:
"What if the fee jumps to $5/barrel?"
Or "What if traffic drops 30%?"

Those nonlinear effects get pretty dramatic.

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